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Abstract 
 
The diagnosis of death by neurological criteria (colloquially known as “brain death”) is accepted 
in some form in law and medical practice throughout the world, and has been endorsed in 
principle by the Catholic Church. However, the rationale for this acceptance has been challenged 
by the accumulation of evidence of integrated vital activity in bodies diagnosed dead by 
neurological criteria. This paper sets out ten different Catholic responses to the current crisis of 
confidence and assesses them in relation to a Catholic understanding of philosophical 
anthropology. Having considered each of these responses, none is found to provide good grounds 
for the moral certainty about death needed for current transplant practice to be ethically 
acceptable. Unless adequate grounds for the use of neurological criteria can be restored, current 
transplantation practice will have become what Pope John Paul II called a “furtive, but no less 
serious and real, form of euthanasia”. 
 
Catholic acceptance of neurological criteria for death 
 
The current practice of organ transplantation is largely dependent on diagnosis of death by 
neurological criteria, 2 colloquially known as “brain death”.3 This is because neurological criteria 
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allow death to be declared while the body is ventilated and the heart is still beating so that the 
organs are perfused with oxygenated blood.  
 
From the first, the practice of donating organs for transplantation was welcomed by the Catholic 
Church.4 In 1956, Pope Pius XII argued that donation of organs after death was not “a violation of 
the reverence due to the dead” rather, it was an expression of “merciful charity shown to some 
suffering brothers and sisters”.5 Pius XII also recognised that determining the time of death was 
not always straightforward. He argued that for someone in a coma, diagnosing death was a 
matter of medical rather than theological competence. “It remains for the doctor, and especially 
the anaesthesiologist, to give a clear and precise definition of ‘death’ and the ‘moment of death’ 
of a patient who passes away in a state of unconsciousness”.6  
 
When neurological criteria for death were first employed for the purposes of transplantation in 
1968 this was therefore greeted with cautious acceptance by a number of Catholic moral 
theologians. An important defender was Germain Grisez. His key argument was quoted in an 
influential US President’s Commission report in 1981: “if the functioning of the brain is the factor 
which principally integrates any organism which has a brain, then if that function is lost, what is 
left is no longer as a whole an organic unity.”7 According to this rationale, neurological criteria 
for death did not represent a new definition of death, but just gave more precise criteria for 
determining that bodily death had occurred.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there was a relatively stable moral theological and medical consensus 
among Catholic scholars in favour of accepting neurological criteria for death,8 though not 
without some dissenting voices.9 Nevertheless, through this whole period there was neither any 
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explicit magisterial10 endorsement of neurological criteria for death, nor was there any explicit 
magisterial condemnation. It was not until 2000 that Pope John Paul II gave a cautious and 
conditional endorsement of neurological criteria for death. This statement gave pastoral 
guidance to Catholics on the legitimacy in principle of using the neurological criteria to 
determine death in the context of organ donation.11 The key paragraph reads as follows: 
 
“Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times for ascertaining the fact of 
death, namely the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied, 
does not seem to conflict with the essential elements of a sound anthropology. Therefore a 
health-worker professionally responsible for ascertaining death can use these criteria in each 
individual case as the basis for arriving at that degree of assurance in ethical judgement which 
moral teaching describes as ‘moral certainty’.”12 
  
The crisis of confidence in neurological criteria for death among Catholic scholars  
 
If the judgment of the whole world is secure (securus judicat orbis terrarium) and if when Rome 
has spoken the case is finished (roma locuta est, causa finita est) why are Catholic scholars still 
discussing the issue of neurological criteria for the determination of death? Why do the well-
established legal-medical consensus (including every jurisdiction and every national professional 
body in the world), and the words of Pope Pius XII and Pope John Paul II, not settle the issue?  
 
In the first place the statement of Pius XII was made at a time when the concept of death was 
not in dispute. However, since the rise of ventilation and organ transplantation, there has been a 
divergence in underlying ideas about the concept of death. Some have sought to redefine death 
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as permanent coma13 others lay stress on prognosis of imminent and inevitable asystole14 others 
have sought to redefine death in terms of utility.15 Some approaches require the death of the 
whole brain,16 some suggest death of the upper brain is sufficient,17 others suggest death of the 
brainstem is sufficient.18 The criteria in use currently in the United Kingdom take death to be 
defined as “the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness, combined with irreversible 
loss of the capacity to breathe”,19 which implies that death could be declared even if some 
brainstem functions remain. Thus the Church can no longer take for granted that all clinicians are 
asking the same question when asking if someone has “died”. This divergence of underlying 
concepts of death means that the contemporary consensus in favour of the use of neurological 
criteria does not necessarily represent a scientific consensus that they are adequate to 
determine death as death has traditionally been understood.20  
 
The key challenge to neurological criteria for death, from a Catholic perspective, is the doubts 
that have always existed as to whether the fulfilment of these criteria necessarily demonstrates 
the death of the body. Since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of philosophers and 
physicians have provided further evidence and arguments that have reinforced these doubts. 
The most significant critic has been D. Alan Shewmon.21 His investigation of unusual cases of the 
prolonged maintenance of “beating heart cadavers” casts doubt on the claim that such bodies 
have lost all integrative vital function. A striking example of such vital function is found in 
pregnant women who, despite being diagnosed as dead by neurological criteria, have 
successfully sustained a pregnancy for several weeks. An even more dramatic example is that of 
children who have been diagnosed as dead by neurological criteria but whose bodies have been 
sustained for years in this condition, in the case of one remarkable child, for over 20 years.22 
How can one understand the sustaining of the body other than as the sustaining of its life? This 
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indeed is the implication of the language commonly used in relation to these cases. Prima facie 
they appear to be cases of “brain death with prolonged somatic survival”.23  
 
The current crisis of confidence is well expressed by the United States President’s Council on 
Bioethics Report of 2008, Controversies in the Determination of Death:  
 
There remains considerable public confusion, both about the meaning of the term 
‘brain dead’ and about its relation to the death of a human being. There is persistent 
dissent by some clinicians, philosophers, and other critical observers who have never 
been convinced that ‘brain death’ is, indeed, the death of the human being. There are, 
as well, pressures against insisting that declaring death, or at least ‘organ donation 
eligibility,’ requires the irreversible loss of function in the whole brain. And, perhaps 
most important, there are critics who have published evidence of ongoing integrated 
bodily activities in some persons meeting the criteria of ‘whole brain death’ and who 
have claimed that this evidence invalidates the rationale for today’s consensus 
position.24  
 
Responses to this crisis 
 
Pope John Paul II taught that “vital organs which occur singly in the body can be removed only 
after death”25 (ethical premise); and that “the death of the person is a single event, consisting in 
the total disintegration of that unitary and integrated whole that is the personal self”26 
(philosophical premise); and that neurological criteria show that “the individual organism has 
lost its integrative capacity”27 (empirical premise). On the basis of these three premises he 
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concluded that neurological criteria can give moral certainty of death. However, the empirical 
premise has now been challenged by “published evidence of ongoing integrated bodily activities 
in some persons meeting the criteria of ‘whole brain death’”28. In the face of this challenge, 
Catholic moral theologians have responded in different ways:29 
 
1. The first response is to reaffirm the ethical, philosophical and empirical premises of John Paul 
II and to dispute the empirical counterevidence of critics such as Shewmon. A common form 
of this response is to state that in the purported counterexamples “brain death” was 
misdiagnosed because the neurological tests were poorly administered.30 
 
2. A similar, but more demanding response is to regard the empirical counterevidence as 
demonstrating that the standard clinical tests are not adequate to determine whether all 
brain activity has ceased irreversibly.31 For example, Tonti-Filippini has argued that 
neurological criteria cannot be fulfilled by medical history and simple clinical tests alone but 
must also involve “imaging of blood flow to the brain”.32 This response does not threaten the 
conceptual basis of the diagnosis of death prior to organ transplantation but constitutes a 
serious challenge to current practice. 
 
3. A slightly different response is to admit that at least some of the apparent counterexamples 
have been diagnosed correctly but to assert that these cases do not involve truly integrated 
bodily activity, only some lesser kind of integration “at a lower level between organs without 
necessarily achieving unity of the entire organism”33. This response is based on the idea that 
the philosophical premise of John Paul II, i.e. the need for somatic integration, needs to be 
understood in a more nuanced way.  
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4. A more radical response is to reject John Paul II’s philosophical premise and relate human life 
and death to radical capacity for sentience.34 In principle this would seem to pave the way 
for “upper brain” death criteria35 that would also encompass patients in a persistent 
vegetative state36 but “whole brain” criteria might be accepted in order to exclude any 
doubt.37 Those holding this view could maintain that they accepted John Paul II’s ethical 
conclusion, but not his philosophical premise. 
 
5. Between loss of capacity for somatic integration (John Paul II’s philosophical premise) and loss 
of capacity for sentience (view 4 above) there may be other philosophical accounts of death 
closer to somatic integration or closer to capacity for sentience. For example, the majority on 
the President’s Council in 2008, including the well-known Catholic legal philosopher Robert 
George, took the view that a body was no longer alive when it was no longer responsive to its 
environment and when it possessed no “inner experience of need”.38 This combination of 
capacities to sense and interact they called the “mode of being”39 of a living organism. 
 
6. Another view, also put forward by Shewmon is to reject the first part of John Paul II’s 
philosophical premise, that “the death of the person is a single event”. In 2004 Shewmon 
attempted to move away from a unitary concept of death from which all diagnostic criteria 
must derive, and instead posited various death events which may be relevant for different 
practical purposes.40 Tonti-Filippini follows Veatch in terming this view that of a 
disaggregator.41    
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7. In the face of the increasingly divergent views from Catholic scholars on the determination of 
death, some commentators have argued that for practical purposes the 2000 teaching of 
John Paul II remains the authoritative pastoral guidance for Catholics. Thus, while this 
teaching is not infallible, unless and until there is convincing evidence to the contrary, it can 
be followed without incurring moral guilt. Hence, “Catholics may in good conscience offer… 
their organs after death as determined on the basis of neurological or cardiopulmonary 
criteria”.42  
 
8. Among those who doubt that neurological criteria are sufficient to give certainty of death, 
some have argued that, nevertheless, in certain carefully defined cases it would be ethical to 
take unpaired vital organs from living patients. This is a possibility entertained by Shewmon 
(who has explored a great many possible positions as his own view has developed). 
According to Shewmon, protocols could be developed such that such vital organs could be 
taken without hastening death. If this is granted then it would seem possible at least in 
principle “to remove vital organs without causing or hastening death or violating the time-
honored injunction primum non nocere.”43 This position should be distinguished from the 
superficially similar proposal of Robert Truog and others that the “dead donor rule” be 
dropped44. 
 
9. By and large, the responses outlined so far would continue to allow retrieval of unpaired vital 
organs from bodies determined as dead by neurological criteria (though some would require 
a more rigorous battery of empirical tests). However, there is a significant body of Catholic 
scholarly opinion that has come to reject both the philosophical basis for neurological criteria 
and the practices that rest upon it. This constitutes a far deeper challenge to the status quo, 
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implying that neurological criteria cannot safely be used for the purpose of post mortem 
organ donation. This view, has not been endorsed by the magisterium but is held by a 
number of well-respected Catholic scholars, including one of the Catholic members of the 
2008 President’s Commission.45 
 
10. A variation on the previous response is to argue that the counter examples are sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt about the validity of neurological criteria. This is the opinion of 
Edmund Pellegrino, the Catholic bioethicist who chaired of the President’s Commission 
Report 2008, but who dissented from its final conclusions.46 The presence of reasonable 
doubt would exclude moral certainty and hence would rule out the use of neurological 
criteria for determining death. Hence in practice this response coheres with response 9.  
 
Broadly speaking, the first two responses concern questions of the adequacy of clinical tests; 
responses 3 to 6 concern the concept of death; and responses 7 to 10 concern the practical 
implications for organ transplantation.  
  
Two ways of understanding Catholic dogma in relation to death 
 
Before considering questions of clinical criteria or application it seems reasonable to start with 
the concept of death. Unless there is agreement as to what is being tested for, it is not possible 
to determine either the adequacy of tests or the practical implications. Furthermore, the 
competence of the Church, on her own account, is not in questions of natural science but rather 
in questions of philosophy, theology, and ethics.  
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Catholic philosophical thought is far from homogeneous but there are some common reference 
points for the Catholic tradition which set limits to an acceptable philosophical anthropology. A 
key dogmatic point of reference is the definition set down by the Council of Vienne in 1312: 
 
“We define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend or hold stubbornly that the 
rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body [forma corporis] of itself and 
essentially, is to be considered a heretic”. 
 
This definition remains binding on Catholic philosophers and theologians. It is expressed in 
Aristotelian terms and has as its context the theological disputes of the high middle ages. The 
definition has sometimes been interpreted as a vindication of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas 
over more “spiritual” accounts of Christian anthropology associated with Augustine of Hippo.47 
However, it is important to note that Vienne did not require a narrowly Thomistic understanding 
of the phrase forma corporis. Nor did it require philosophers to express the unity of the person in 
Aristotelian terms. It only required that where such terms were used the rational soul was not 
denied to be the form of the body. Thus while the definition of Vienne sets limits for Catholic 
anthropology there were and will remain a number of Catholic schools of thought that fall within 
these limits.  
 
The definition of death given by John Paul II is clearly in conformity with Vienne. If the living 
human being is an integrated unity of body and soul, then death surely consists in “the total 
disintegration of that unitary and integrated whole”.48 The identification of the rational soul as 
the principle of bodily life can therefore be understood as implying that while the body is alive, 
the rational soul is present, even if the person cannot exercise the full range of human abilities.49  
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The same doctrine can, however, be turned on its head so that it is argued that when the 
rational capacity is no longer present then specifically human bodily life has come to an end. This 
was the view of Shewmon in 1985, who argued that “the minimum sufficient condition for the 
death of a person is the irreversible destruction of those parts of the brain necessary for the 
properly human functions of the spiritual soul, namely intellect and will”50. Accepting an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic account of substantial change, Shewmon argued that, if the capacity for 
rationality is irreversibly destroyed then “the body has been rendered incompatible with the 
human essence, so a substantial change must have taken place”51. The cadaver, the human 
remains, is not the same living body but is generated from the subhuman forms that were 
previously present only in a virtual way. We may call this view, death as the loss of radical 
capacity for rationality (RCR).52  
 
Given the Thomistic framework both of John Paul II’s account and of RCR, neither can be ruled 
out simply by appeal to the Council of Vienne. Shewmon fully acknowledged that the rational 
soul was “the form of the body”. His question was whether the loss of this specifically human 
living form could generate a living but less-than-human form. Nevertheless, while RCR is not 
altogether excluded by dogmatic considerations it suffers from serious philosophical and ethical 
problems. There are obvious similarities between RCR and the approach of John Harris and other 
bioethicists who distinguish between human beings and persons: “Once a new human individual 
comes into existence she will gradually move from being a potential or a pre-person into an 
actual person when she becomes capable of valuing her own existence. And it is very difficult to 
say precisely when this is. And if, eventually, she permanently loses this capacity, she will have 
ceased to be a person.”53 While RCR appeals to the Aristotelian metaphysics of substantial 
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change rather than the Lockean idea of insubstantial personhood, it seems to share with certain 
contemporary bioethicists the claim that there are living humanoid entities that are 
“nonpersons”.  
 
This notion is philosophically problematic because of the avoidable multiplication of entities: the 
postulation of an integrated living organism that is human in some sense but that is not a human 
being. Why should we posit the coming to be of a novel living entity when phenomenologically 
this seems to be the same life of the same human body? Why should the loss of this particular 
capacity be thought to mark the border between life and death? People live with the loss of 
many human capacities (their sight, mobility, fertility). We do not generally regard someone as 
dead because he or she is unconscious and still less because he or she, while minimally 
conscious, has lost the power of reason. Why should we regard the loss of the ability to reason 
as equivalent to death merely because it is irreversible? The loss of human abilities through 
injury is often irreversible. In cases of post coma unresponsiveness, or of the minimally conscious 
state, or of dementia, it is even less plausible to say that this loss of mental capacity is the death 
of the human organism or that such patients are not human beings but merely “humanoid 
animals”54. This, as Spaemann contends “is contrary to all immediate perception”55. Indeed while 
RCR is superficially similar to the view of bioethicists such as John Harris, these bioethicists are 
more faithful to the phenomena, for “they do declare the person expired, but do not for this 
reason yet consider the human being dead”56. 
 
Furthermore RCR is not only philosophically inconveniens, it is also morally dangerous. To 
suggest that patients who have lost the capacity to reason are no longer human persons 
effectively strips them of fully moral status. The early Shewmon countered this with an argument 
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that, as the absence of capacity for rationality cannot be diagnosed with certainty, these patients 
“must be given the benefit of the doubt and treated with all the respect and care which any sick 
human being deserves”57. However by resorting to arguments from the benefit of the doubt 
Shewmon implied the status of such patients was doubtful and he created a hostage to fortune. 
Other clinicians might have no such diagnostic doubts in relation to a particular case. From the 
perspective of the Catholic moral tradition this is very problematic. There is something deeply 
repugnant about the very possibility of saying of a conscious human living being that he or she is 
not a person but “an animal which looks like the former person”58. John Paul II expressed a 
common Catholic moral conviction when he asserted that “A man, even if seriously ill or disabled 
in the exercise of his highest functions, is and always will be a man, and he will never become a 
‘vegetable’ or an ‘animal’.”59 
 
Radical Capacity for Sentience  
 
Shewmon’s own view developed over time and by 1997 he had decisively rejected the RCR 
account of death.60 Nevertheless, it is useful to consider his earlier views as they represent a very 
clear articulation of RCR. They also shed light on one of the Catholic responses to the current 
crisis (response 4). May, and Lee and Grisez and others61 defend what is a more ethically 
conservative variant on RCR by arguing that death should be identified with the loss of the 
radical capacity for sentience (RCS). Taking loss of RCS as the concept of death has the advantage 
that it protects patients with dementia (who are clearly sentient if not necessarily rational) and it 
strengthens the argument from the benefit of the doubt (for it is much easier to argue that some 
residual consciousness may be possible than to argue that rationality is still possible). However 
this ethical gain comes at a significant philosophical cost. For it is simply arbitrary to choose 
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sentience as a definition of human life. RCS sits uneasily between the loss of rationality (the 
highest and most essential human capacity) and the loss of somatic integration (the most basic 
or common capacity of biological organisms). Sentience marks out animals from plants, but if 
there is an essential capacity that one cannot lose without ceasing to be human, a distinguishing 
characteristic of the human soul, then the Catholic tradition has always identified this with the 
intellect, not with the senses. If Lee and Grisez state that death as a substantial change could 
involve the destruction of what is essentially human while leaving behind a “large living entity”62 
then they have no reason, except by appeal to the benefit of the doubt, to stipulate that that this 
entity must be unconscious.63 On this point, the early Shewmon was more willing to follow the 
line of argument to its logical conclusion and admit that it implies that patients with severe 
dementia might not be human persons.  
 
The philosophical and moral difficulties of the RCR thesis (and hence of RCS) could be resolved if 
more stress was given to the idea of a radical capacity. This emphasis is necessary in order to 
distinguish a substantial change from an injury that “merely blocks the expression of rational 
potential”,64 that is, to distinguish death as diagnosed by neurological criteria from forms of 
severe cognitive impairment. However, reflection on the radical character of this capacity directs 
our attention away from the loss of particular capacities and towards more general 
characteristics of living organisms. This can be seen from Catholic discussion of potential for 
rationality in relation to the human embryo. The capacity for rationality which an embryo 
possesses is not immediate but developmental. Furthermore this capacity cannot be identified 
with the actual likelihood of developing rational powers, for children who die from genetic 
defects before exercising the power of reason are certainly living human beings. Rather, all living 
human beings possess a radical capacity for rationality because they share a human nature, and 
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it is part of the nature of human beings to develop and actualise rational powers. This is true 
even if the power has not yet developed or is blocked by disease or injury. Hence the presence of 
integrated bodily life in a being that possesses a human nature is both necessary and sufficient to 
ascribe to that entity a radical capacity for rationality.  
 
Thus, the idea of a radical capacity is compatible with a Catholic understanding of anthropology 
only inasmuch as the term “radical” is understood in a sense that implies that the capacity is 
present whenever a living human body is present, that is, until “the total disintegration of that 
unitary and integrated whole that is the personal self”. The definition of Vienne is compatible 
both with RCR and death as loss of somatic integration. The considerations here suggest that 
RCR is co-extensive with somatic integration but that for the purpose of establishing criteria for 
death, it is RCR that must be understood in relation to somatic integration, rather than vice 
versa. Somatic integration should take priority epistemically if not metaphysically. 
 
This discussion also sheds light on the “modes of being” view developed by the President’s 
Council in 2008 (response 5). This shares some features with RCS inasmuch as it focuses on the 
appetitive character of breathing, that is, the distinctively animal characteristic, rather than vital 
activity at the vegetative level. However, inasmuch as it is analogous to RCS, the same criticisms 
apply. Why should “inner experience of need” be chosen as essential to human life? It is not the 
most specific quality of human life nor is it the most basic to biological life. It is difficult to 
understand the rationale for the concept except as a device to defend the clinical status quo in 
the face of evidence of continuing somatic integration. The “modes of being” view is more 
ethically conservative than RCS (in that it does not require capacity for consciousness but only 
for a more basic level of biological responsiveness). However, the logic of the position is similarly 
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weak. Once an element of experience or responsiveness is included in the definition of life, it is 
difficult to see why it should not be extended to more distinctively human experience or 
responsiveness.    
 
Disaggregation and the removal of vital organs before metaphysical death  
 
Rather than defend any one account of death, an alternative response is to abandon any single 
account of death (response 7). This position was explored by Shewmon in 2004 and defended in 
a more specific form in 2010. There is a certain amount to be said for this if we are talking merely 
about prudence and uncertainty. It can be the case that, depending on the context, more or less 
certainty is required about the determination of death. For example, if a person’s heart has 
stopped irreversibly (despite sustained efforts at resuscitation) then the patient may reasonably 
be declared to be dead, though the sacrament of the sick may still be given sometime after this, 
if the body is still warm. The person may be regarded as likely to be dead for some purposes but 
not for others.  
 
From the perspective of philosophical anthropology, however, and still more from the 
perspective of Catholic dogma, it is not tenable to hold that there are many “death events” that 
are equally basic. If the soul is the form of the living body, and death is the separation of body 
and soul, then it will either be the case, or will not be the case, that this has happened. The soul 
either is, or is not, informing the body. Dying is a process, but death is not a process, it is the 
limit of that process. The attempt to disaggregate different meanings of “death” also seems to 
contradict the definition of the Council of Florence that there is one death after which the souls 
of those who have been cleansed from sin are received immediately (mox) into heaven while 
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those who die in actual mortal sin go immediately (mox) to hell. It may be difficult (and in a 
particular case perhaps impossible) to tell whether or not someone has died, but there are 
weighty philosophical and theological reasons for Catholics to hold that “the death of the person 
is a single event”.  
 
In 2010 Shewmon put forward two senses of death, a “civil end” sufficient for ethical and legal 
purposes (passing away) and a “metaphysical end” reflecting the death of the organism as it is 
“in itself” (deanimation).65 This “semantic bisection” of the concept of death enabled Shewmon 
to assent to the dead donor rule, that “vital organs which occur singly in the body can be 
removed only after death”, while at the same time acknowledging that death in the metaphysical 
sense had not yet occurred. However, this approach attempts to secure by redefinition what can 
only be established by ethical analysis. Passing away is an acceptable sense of death “for most 
practical purposes” if and only if it is ethically acceptable to treat someone as dead before 
metaphysical death. This is seen most obviously in the analogy Shewmon uses between passing 
away as a “civil end” and birth as a “civil beginning”. The controversy over abortion clearly 
demonstrates that taking birth as a “civil beginning” is reasonable only inasmuch as it is ethical 
to act as though life had not yet begun. The ethics of abortion cannot be settled simply by appeal 
to birth as a common socio-legal “civil beginning”. Similarly the ethics of organ retrieval cannot 
be settled by the identification of a “civil end”.  
 
Shewmon was thus on stronger ground in 2004 in arguing that “Regarding organ transplantation, 
the important and truly meaningful question is not ‘When is the patient dead?’ but rather ‘When 
can organs X, Y, Z… be removed without causing or hastening death or harming the patient in 
any way?’”.66 For, the question is not whether there are meanings of “death” other than 
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metaphysical death but whether vital organs can ethically be removed before metaphysical 
death, where this does not cause or hasten death (response 8). The invocation of other 
meanings of death does not help this ethical analysis but rather obscures it. Indeed, greater 
clarity here serves only to highlight the ethical problems with taking unpaired vital organs from 
such patients. It cannot reasonably be said “there is no harm in taking the patient’s heart, as he 
wasn’t using it at the time!”67 Even if the heart is not actually beating, removing a healthy heart 
from a living patient is at the very least an act of mutilation. 
 
Provisional ethical conclusions 
 
The foregoing considerations vindicate Pope John Paul II’s philosophical and ethical premises: 
“the death of the person is a single event, consisting in the total disintegration of that unitary and 
integrated whole that is the personal self” and “vital organs which occur singly in the body can be 
removed only after death”. However, if these premises are accepted then evidence of somatic 
integration after the fulfilment of neurological criteria undermines the validity of the 
neurological approach to diagnosing death. There may well be problems with misdiagnosis of 
death using neurological criteria (responses 1 and 2) and this is a significant cause of ethical 
concern, but this does not seem to exhaust the problem. For, it is difficult to account for the 
evidence acknowledged by the Presidents Commission only on the basis of misdiagnosis.   
 
Having become aware of the extent of this problem, some Catholic scholars have sought to 
redefine death in relation to radical capacity for sentience (response 4) or mode of being 
(response 5) or have sought to disaggregate different meanings of death (response 6). However, 
it has been argued in this paper that these attempts are flawed both philosophically and 
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ethically. Nor has Shewmon in his most recent work provided a satisfactory account of how it 
could be ethical to take unpaired vital organs prior to metaphysical death (response 8).68 From 
the perspective of the present paper, these diverse responses should therefore be understood 
not a potential solutions but as symptoms of the depth of the underlying problem.  
 
The multiplication of different responses also shows why it is not adequate simply to appeal to 
the statement of Pope John Paul II in 2000 as the basis for moral certainty that neurological 
criteria are valid (response 7). For the statement of John Paul II was based explicitly on certain 
premises. The pope showed his reasoning. He endorsed neurological criteria conditionally, 
inasmuch as they reflected “the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain activity”69 and 
inasmuch as this cessation implied that “the individual organism has lost its integrative 
capacity”70. However the weight of counterevidence gathered by Shewmon and others gives 
good reason to think that one or other of these conditions does not hold, and hence the 
conclusion does not follow.71  
 
Many of those who have come to reject the exclusive focus on brain activity as a basis for 
diagnosing death (response 9) have done so because they no longer regard the brain as the sole 
regulator or integrator of bodily life. Shewmon has argued that bodily integration is a holistic 
feature of the living body and the brain acts not as the source of this integration but as 
contributor to and “fine-tuner” of a pre-existing vital integration.72 For this reason, in principle, 
the body could maintain integrated vital functioning even after the loss of all brain function. This 
is what seems to be happening in cases of somatic survival after brain death.  
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Without denying Shewmon’s account of brain activity, Tonti-Filippini (a leading advocate of 
responses 3) has quite reasonably draw attention to the different ways that “integration” can be 
understood. Integration is an analogical concept and is closely related to the concept of unity, 
one of the transcendentals. “One” is used in many senses. It therefore needs to be asked 
whether “the concept of integration within the medical literature”73 adequately reflects the 
sense of integration implied by the substantial unity of an organism. This is not a matter of 
looking for a certain “degree of integration” as though this were a point along a continuum of 
integration. The integration of a living organism is integration of a distinct kind or category. 
Tonti-Filippini argues that neurological criteria are sufficient in principle to determine death, 
understood as loss of somatic integration, if this integration is understood in the proper sense.  
 
Tonti-Filippini’s defence of neurological criteria is strengthened by his supposition that as well as 
conceptual confusion as to what constitutes integration there are also clinical aspects to the 
problem in that standard tests are insufficient to show irreversible loss of all brain function. He 
thus argues that all alleged counterexamples can be resolved either as misdiagnosis showing the 
need for more rigorous tests (response 2) or as examples of lesser integration showing the need 
for clarity about what constitutes integration (response 3). However, this argument immediately 
raises a difficult question: how can we recognise the sense of integration proper to the unity of a 
biological organism, and in particular, to a human being? We need an account of the specific 
somatic integration of a living organism as a substance in the Aristotelian sense but there is no 
current consensus among Catholic scholars as to what such an account would involve.  
 
It should also be noticed that Tonti-Filippini’s approach includes the supposition that current 
neurological tests are insufficiently rigorous. Thus while his defence offers a possible route to a 
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future restoration in confidence about neurological criteria among Catholic scholars, in relation 
to current practice, his argument implies the same conclusion as responses 9 and 10, that 
neurological criteria as currently applied do not provide moral certainty of death.  
 
The Catholic acceptance of neurological criteria for death is thus in crisis. Having considered ten 
contemporary responses to this crisis it seems that none provides good grounds for the moral 
certainty about death needed for current transplant practice to be ethically acceptable. Unless 
and until adequate grounds for the use of neurological criteria are restored, current practice will 
merit the admonition given by John Paul II in 1995.  
 
“Nor can we remain silent in the face of other more furtive, but no less serious and real, forms of 
euthanasia. These could occur for example when, in order to increase the availability of organs 
for transplants, organs are removed without respecting objective and adequate criteria which 
verify the death of the donor.”74 
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